Broad Shareholder Value and the Inevitable Role of Conscience
Paul Weitzel* Zachariah J. Rodgers** This article proposes an integrative solution to the modern debate on corporate purpose, the question of whether directors and officers must solely maximize profits or whether they may consider the effects on employees, the environment or the community. Many find pure profit maximization unseemly and suggest alternative theories, typically arguing that corporations owe a duty to a broader range of stakeholders. This position is inconsistent with the case law and unnecessary to allow conscience in the board room. We resolve the issue more simply by acknowledging that the purpose of a corporation is to promote the shareholders' interests, which includes the shareholders' financial and nonfinancial interests. These nonfinancial interests could encompass product safety, the treatment of employees or environmental concerns. We refer to this focus as broad shareholder value. In this article we show that a broader view of shareholder value is superior to competing models in theory, in case law, and in explaining the empirical evidence.
First, our theories of what a corporation is (corporate identity) imply that the proper corporate purpose is promotion of broad shareholder value, not mere profit maximization or duties to other stakeholders. Second, the case law does not require pure profit maximization, as has been claimed, but instead allows consideration of other shareholder interests. For support, we provide a new understanding of the case law using principles of game theory and applying evidentiary burdens. And third, a theory of broad shareholder value best explains the empirical evidence of what directors and officers actually do and what shareholders actually want. In short, real world evidence shows that pure wealth maximization theories lack both explanatory power and a normative mandate in the real world. A broad shareholder value norm provides a stronger explanation and mandate than pure wealth maximization, without contradicting case law requirements that boards consider only the interests of shareholders, rather than other stakeholders. 
PART I. INTRODUCTION
To outsiders it may seem remarkable that corporate scholars and judges are so deeply divided about the most foundational question in corporate law: What is the purpose of a corporation? Can directors serve social or moral interests when making decisions or must they consider only profits?
In this article, we show that corporations are most efficient when directors are allowed to consider the social and moral norms of their shareholders. We refer to this as the broad shareholder value norm.
For support, we provide new thinking on the theoretical underpinnings of corporate entities, creating new ties to our theories of what a corporation is. We show that our theories of corporate identity offer stronger support for the broad shareholder value norm than they do for pure shareholder wealth maximization or other competing theories.
Next, we address the case law. While many have argued that the cases do not require maximizing shareholder wealth, doing so often relies on weak interpretations. These weak interpretations arise out of an attempt to prove too much. Scholars opposing shareholder wealth maximization typically argue that directors or managers have an affirmative duty to other stakeholders-such as employees, suppliers or local communities-or that managers and directors have unbounded discretion to follow their own conscience. This contradicts the case law, which requires that only shareholders' interests be considered. The broad shareholder value norm affirms the incorporation of moral and social norms, without requiring the proliferation of duties owed to others that claim a stake in the firm.
Finally, we build upon the prior empirical work in the field to show how disconnected the shareholder wealth maximization norm is from reality. The measure of any good theory is its ability to predict real world outcomes. On that measure, we continue the work of other scholars to show that the shareholder wealth maximization norm fails to account for the actions of directors and managers and the preferences of shareholders.
This article proceeds in six parts. Part II reviews the major theories of corporate purpose and outlines their various weaknesses. Part III analyzes the theoretical underpinning of our theory of corporate identity, showing that the broad shareholder value norm is more efficient and fits better into our understanding of corporate identity than the shareholder wealth maximization norm or stakeholder theories. Part IV surveys the recent case law, focusing on two major cases that have troubled scholars who oppose shareholder wealth maximization theories. The broad shareholder value norm allows room for moral values in corporate actions, but fits naturally into Delaware law. Part V builds upon prior empirical work to show that the broad shareholder value norm better predicts real world actions than the shareholder wealth maximization norm by examining evidence of shareholder and director preferences and actions. Part VI offers concluding thoughts and suggestions for further research.
PART II. THE GREAT DEBATE
One of the most fundamental questions in corporate law is whether directors or managers can consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies. The chief justice of the supreme court of Delaware, Leo Strine, has called this the Great Debate. 1 Another Delaware chancellor, William Allen, characterized it less charitably, calling our dueling understanding of corporate purpose "schizophrenic." 2 The debate has raged through the corporate literature for more than eighty years, 3 engulfing judges, scholars, practitioners, economists, politicians, directors and the electorate. 4 Equally remarkable is how convinced each side is that the debate is all but won.
A. Shareholder Wealth Maximization
The dominant theory is shareholder wealth maximization, which is part of a larger theory known as shareholder primacy. 5 Shareholder primacy theory holds that corporations are to be controlled by and on behalf of the shareholders. Under early versions of this theory, shareholders were seen as the owners of the corporation, with the managers or directors serving as their trustees. 6 As trustees, the managers or directors were required to care for the interests of shareholders, interests which over time have been reduced to profit maximization.
Later work rejected the idea that shareholders own the firm, describing the corporation not as a thing to be owned, but as a nexus of contracts. 7 Each interaction with the corporation was governed by contract, with corporate law providing default rules that the parties were free to customize. Under that understanding, shareholder wealth maximization was seen as the proper corporate purpose because it reduces agency costs. 8 The idea is that "directors that are responsible for everyone are accountable to no one" and without clear accountability, "directors will be tempted to pursue their own self-interest." 9 With a clear corporate purpose-maximizing wealth to shareholders-directors will feel less leeway to line their own pockets in the name of social benefit. Going further, the efficient market hypothesis suggests that all information about a publicly traded firm is reflected in the stock price, which leads to stronger versions of shareholder primacy theory, which argue that the directors' only purpose is to increase the stock price. 10 The theoretical soundness of the shareholder wealth maximization norm helped it find its way into case law, which many argue mandates a singular focus on shareholder value.
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For example, a recent opinion from the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an injunction on a plan implemented by a corporation's directors because it "openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization." 12 A majority of scholars accept this theory. Chief Justice Leo Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court wrote in his personal capacity that "corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders." 13 Many scholars even contend that there is no rational alternative. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman declared that we are converging on the "End of History of Corporate Law" because " [t] here is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value." 14 Professor Stephen Bainbridge echoes this sentiment, declaring "the shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . indisputably is the law in the United States." 15 David Yosifon, after a thorough review of the cases, found that shareholder wealth maximization is "undoubtedly the law of Delaware," even while adding that he "do [es] not believe this rule is desirable." 16 A large body of scholars and jurists believe shareholder wealth maximization is required by law and that this is as it should be.
However, the theory has several problems. First, it lacks empirical support. There is strong evidence that directors and managers consider many things other than shareholder wealth maximization. This suggests that as a descriptive theory, the shareholder wealth maximization norm is aspirational at best and irrelevant at worst. Consequently, as a prescriptive theory, it is misguided and even destructive to comprehensive shareholder value. 17 In addition, there is strong evidence that shareholders sacrifice their financial interests to promote their nonfinancial interests. 18 If shareholders do not want pure profit maximization, the shareholder wealth maximization norm loses much of its theoretical support. The theory supporting the norm is largely based on protecting shareholders' interests. If shareholders care about more than just profits, the theoretical support for pure profit maximization weakens. 19 Moreover, many find the concept of pure shareholder wealth maximization unsavory. The norm explicitly ignores any social or moral consequences as long as the action is more profitable. As David Millon wrote, "corporate law has always understood-though usually only dimly-that truly relentless pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization is inconsistent with actual business practice and socially unacceptable in any event." 20 Although the shareholder wealth maximization norm is still the dominant theory of corporate purpose, these weaknesses have led a small but growing number of scholars to suggest alternatives.
B. Alternatives to Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Scholars opposing shareholder wealth maximization offer several opposing theories, which vary widely. These theories are often lumped together as "stakeholder theories," because they consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders. On one end of the spectrum, Einer Elhauge modestly suggests that directors be given broader discretion to do what they think is right. 21 On the other end of the spectrum, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout propose that directors are "mediating hierarchs" among the corporation's various constituents, with an affirmative duty to "balance . . . competing interests" among shareholders, employees, or other constituents. 22 These theories align better with the empirical data on director action and shareholder preference, and they overcome the socially distasteful idea of corporate actors ignoring moral and social norms.
Like their opponents, these scholars also argue the debate is nearly won. "Put simply, shareholder value ideology is based on wishful thinking, not reality. As a theory of corporate purpose, it is poised for intellectual collapse." 23 However, these theories are difficult to reconcile with Delaware law. Delaware law requires a unitary focus on shareholder value, and diverting resources for the benefit of other stakeholders violates this requirement.
C. The Broad Shareholder Value Norm
This article argues that the broad shareholder value norm may bridge this intellectual divide and overcome the problems faced by both camps. 24 We argue that shareholder wealth maximization is based upon a faulty premise: that shareholders value only profits. If we remove this faulty premise and accept that shareholders value something other than profits, three things happen. First, the shareholder primacy theory fits more squarely into We owe a great deal to each of these authors for their efforts and insights. This article's unique contribution is showing that the broad shareholder value norm can fully bridge the intellectual divide between the two positions by resolving the weaknesses in the competing theories. It provides unique theoretical support, unique interpretations of recent case law, and builds on the empirical foundation showing that shareholders value more than just profits. our theories of corporate identity. Second, the shareholder primacy theory begins to align with the empirical evidence of how managers behave. And third, we alleviate the social and moral problems of considering only profits and the inefficiency created by limiting directors' actionable information.
The broad shareholder value norm also improves upon prior stakeholder theories. Because it allows consideration of only the shareholders' interests-whether financial, moral or social-it aligns more closely with the case law, especially in cases of a pending takeover.
In short, the problems raised by the prior theories are resolved. This part discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the broad shareholder value norm. We begin with a description of the currently dominant theory, shareholder wealth maximization. We then analyze this theory of corporate purpose (wealth maximization) under the dominant theories of corporate identity (nexus of contracts, agency).
A. Defining Shareholder Wealth Maximization
There are three concepts to keep in mind when analyzing shareholder wealth maximization. First, shareholder wealth maximization is not mere "shareholder wealth improvement." It is common to hear that a social initiative is shareholder wealth maximizing because it is profitable. For example, suppose providing free child care to employees costs $100 in direct costs but allows the firm to save $110 by reducing attrition. This action is wealth increasing, but it may not be wealth maximizing. To determine if a project is wealth maximizing, we must consider every other way we might have used that $100. If any of those possibilities would increase profits by $111, then providing child care is not wealth maximizing. 25 A course of action maximizes shareholder wealth if and only if no other course of action would have produced more shareholder wealth. If any other action would have brought in one additional penny, the action did not maximize shareholder wealth.
Second, shareholder wealth maximization is distinct from shareholder value maximization. 26 Shareholders may value things other than wealth, which necessarily implies a balance of interests. When making a decision, the costs and benefits are calculated for various effects, e.g., how will it affect profits, employee happiness or air quality. Under shareholder value maximization, these outputs are weighed and a course of action is selected that best improves the shareholders' total well-being. Under shareholder wealth maximization, all outputs except profits are ignored, and the course of action that maximizes profits is selected. In other words, maximizing for shareholder interests will reach the same result as shareholder wealth maximization if and only if the shareholders place zero value on every consequence but wealth.
Third, while the shareholder wealth maximization norm prohibits consideration of anything but profits, in practice it is too flexible to offer real guidance. 27 Ex ante, and with imperfect information, the shareholder wealth maximization norm is broad enough to cover any possible course of action. A director or officer with even the slightest amount of cleverness can invent some reason why their preferred action is profit maximizing. This is why academic articles supporting profit maximization theories typically begin their hypotheticals by assuming what is or is not profit maximizing.
Examples of this flexibility are plentiful. A donation to a university might increase goodwill, which will create a favorable business environment, which will generate sales, which will increase profits. 28 Establishing an art museum next door may build goodwill, which will improve the company's financial condition, which will increase profits. 29 Granting scholarships could increase the education base, making skilled labor slightly cheaper, reducing total employment costs, which will increase profits. 30 Perhaps these claims are correct; perhaps they are not. But the Rube-Goldberg-like explanations frequently supporting them show that in practice shareholder wealth maximization is a very flexible norm. Because justifications are so easily devised, managers face almost no serious constraints from the shareholder wealth maximization norm. 31 26 For a fuller description of these differences, 31 The notable exception here is in takeover cases. See Part IV, infra.
B. The Nexus of Contracts Framework: The Hypothetical Bargain Methodology
Most scholars understand the corporation not as a thing to be owned, but as a nexus of contracts. 32 To determine what the proper purpose of a corporation is under the nexus of contracts model, we will employ the hypothetical bargain methodology. This methodology was developed by Professor Bainbridge in his groundbreaking work on the director primacy model. 33 The justification for the method is as follows.
The nexus of contracts model of the corporation holds that a corporation is not a separate person or a thing to be owned, but is instead a collection of contracts between shareholders, directors, suppliers, employees, customers and others. 34 Each of these constituents has a bundle of rights and obligations that form their contract with the other constituents.
Negotiating for each of these contracts would be costly, so corporate law serves as a body of default rules that can be adopted off-the-shelf. By adopting the corporate form these groups quickly establish rights and responsibilities to the other constituents. 35 Often, corporate law allows the parties to negotiate out of these default rules, but doing so creates bargaining costs. Therefore, the focus of corporate law is to provide rules that would be most commonly selected by corporations. This approach minimizes bargaining costs by allowing the maximum number of corporations to adopt the default rule.
One of the rules that must be selected is the purpose of the corporation. 36 The default should be the purpose that would be decided by a plurality of corporations. One methodology to determine what corporations would select as their purpose is to consider a hypothetical, costless bargain between the stakeholders to see how a negotiation may turn out. This is the hypothetical bargain methodology. 35 Bainbridge, Director Primacy, 39 ("If corporate law consists mainly of default rules, corporate statutes and decisions can be viewed as a standard form contract voluntarily adopted-perhaps with modifications-by the corporation's various constituencies."). 36 The phrase "corporate purpose" and its variants are a misnomer under the contractarian model. Because the model holds that the corporation is a nexus of contracts, it cannot have wishes, desires or purpose-it is merely a nexus of obligations, duties and rights. The purpose of each contract will be different for each party. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976) ("We seldom fall into the trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market as an individual, but we often make this error by thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motivations and intentions."). However, the term "corporate purpose" is typically used under the contractarian theory as a shorthand to describe the primary duty of directors or officers, and this article conforms to that convention.
Identifying the Bargainers
The first step in the hypothetical bargain methodology is to identify who is invited to the bargain. Under the dominant theory, "the corporation [is] a vehicle by which directors hire capital . . . [so] the focus here is on bargaining between shareholders and the board of directors." 37 However, this assumes that shareholders are a relevant source of capital and that hiring capital is more important than hiring other resources.
Since 1994, directors of public companies, on net, are not raising capital through equity issuances. 38 The aggregate issuance of equity during that time has been negative, meaning that corporations are repurchasing or retiring more equity than they are issuing. 39 Shareholders are on average a use, not a source, of cash for public corporations.
But even assuming that shareholders provide a relevant amount of cash to a corporation, it is not clear why this gives them a privileged seat at the bargaining table. Cash is also provided by credit facilities with local banks or in the market by issuing notes or bonds. Shareholders provide the same benefit-cash-as these other stakeholders, so this is not a sufficient reason to give them the privileged seat at the bargaining table.
It's also unclear why cash is more important than contributions by other stakeholders. If we invite to the bargain only the party that provides the most value to the corporation, then the invitees would vary for each corporation. For some, it might be the patent owners that have licensed their technology to the firm. For others, it would likely be the employees, who bring firm specific human capital. Because we are setting up a default rule that should apply to as many corporations as possible, we do best by inviting everyone to the bargain.
This article addresses each bargaining party in turn, beginning with shareholders. The results would be the same even if only shareholders and directors were invited to the negotiation.
Shareholder Interests
Shareholders will prefer a model that allows directors to act upon all of their interests, rather than just their financial interests.
Efficient decision making requires understanding the full consequences and weighing all benefits and costs. This includes understanding the social and moral consequences, as well as the financial consequences, of decisions. Much of corporate law is a debate about whose benefits and costs are weighed and who does the weighing.
Under the shareholder wealth maximization norm, the shareholders are the relevant party for whom the benefits and costs are weighed. The directors are the party weighing the benefits and costs. However, the shareholder wealth maximization norm eliminates the directors' authority to consider the shareholders' nonfinancial interests. The authority to weigh nonfinancial interests is not granted to anyone else-it is simply assumed away. It effectively limits the information available to directors when making a decision. Assuming the shareholders place some non-zero value on any nonfinancial interest, this structure leads to inefficient resource allocations. The case for shareholder wealth maximization provides two arguments that shareholders will demand shareholder wealth maximization. First, shareholders have fewer legal and contractual protections. 40 For example, employees are protected by workplace safety regulations and minimum wage laws. Because shareholders have fewer legal protections than, say, employees, shareholders will place more value on being protected by the directors. Therefore, shareholders will bargain for a rule that requires the directors to look out for the shareholders' interests. Because the parties value the directors' protection differently, there are gains from trade and a bargain will be struck that prioritizes the shareholders' interests.
This argument is sound, but it doesn't favor shareholder wealth maximization over broad shareholder value. Both norms put the interests of shareholders first. The difference is that shareholder wealth maximization limits which of the shareholders' interests are relevant. Considering the nonfinancial interests of shareholders doesn't change the protections of other stakeholders, such as employees, and it strengthens the protections shareholders have, so this argument offers equal support to the broad shareholder value norm.
Second, proponents of shareholder wealth maximization argue that considering nonfinancial interests will make shareholders' investment more risky and, all else being equal, higher risk commands higher returns. 41 Even assuming that this is true, shareholders may prefer lower returns in exchange for nonfinancial interests.
An example may clarify. Suppose we are shareholders of a pharmaceutical company developing a new drug. The question is whether to engage in clinical trials overseas to reduce regulatory costs to prove the drug's initial efficacy before continuing the investment. 42 Suppose conducting the trials domestically would increase regulatory costs such that our expected return would be limited to 8%. Conducting the trials in the reduced regulatory environment overseas would lead to more deaths, but would increase our expected return to 8.1%. 43 Assume also that we can avoid any publicity or other negative effects from these deaths, or, if the reader prefers, assume the total return provided here already deducts expected losses from these negative consequences. Could a group of shareholders find the loss of life so repugnant that they would reject the additional 0.1% return in favor of life? Suppose instead that the additional return is only 0.0001%. What if the additional return were only a few dollars?
Under the shareholder wealth maximization norm, it's irrelevant whether the additional savings are billions of dollars or a single penny-wealth is to be maximized. It's equally irrelevant whether reducing our safeguards kills one person or a thousand. Under the shareholder wealth maximization norm directors put only one item on the scales: profits. 44 If it is more profitable once all costs are considered, no other factor matters.
To be clear, we are not arguing that shareholders would never trade X lives for Y dollars. Civilization requires that each person consciously or unconsciously accept some X and Y for this equation. Instead, the argument is that the X and Y can be so disproportionate that shareholders would prefer not to maximize profits in a given instance. If at some point the value of life outweighs the profits, then the value of a life must already be somewhere on the scale.
This shows that conscience is inevitably part of corporate decision making. If we are weighing only profits, then no amount of lost life can matter. If lost life can ever tip the scale, it must already be on the scale. Put another way, if shareholders will reject profits at some valuation of human life, then human life is already part of their utility function. Even if conscience carries the day in only the most extreme situation, in every other situation directors must ask "Is this that situation?" Conscience is inevitable. The broad shareholder value norm advances corporate law by recognizing and explicitly incorporating this insight.
Returning to the original question, would shareholders negotiate away the right to have directors consider social and moral norms in order to avoid reduced profit margins? As explained in more detail in Part V, there is strong empirical evidence that shareholders do sacrifice profits to promote their nonfinancial interests. If shareholders value social and moral norms, the most likely result is that they would allow the directors to consider them.
There are several counterarguments to this point. First, one might fight the hypothetical, arguing that such an extreme example would never happen in real life. The numbers used in the example were invented, but the underlying fact pattern was drawn from Pfizer's use of Trovan in Nigeria in 1996. 45 Pfizer's practices were alleged to have been responsible for the deaths of eleven children, with others suffering paralysis, deafness and blindness. 46 These tradeoffs happen in real life.
One might instead argue that any corporation that took such extreme actions to maximize profits would encounter negative publicity, legal sanctions and increased regulations that would make the action unprofitable in the long-term.
It would be wonderful if this were true. If doing the right thing were always the more profitable action, and that were observable, then there would be no need for ethics or for moral and social norms. But the evidence often suggests otherwise. Annual sales for the drug used in the hypothetical above were allegedly expected to exceed $1 billion annually. 47 After a series of court cases, Pfizer settled for around $75 million in total, less than 10% of their expected sales over a single year. 48 This real world example shows that expected profits can grossly outweigh the direct costs of morally questionable conduct.
This result is unlikely to change if we consider the indirect costs. We were unable to uncover any serious boycott efforts against Pfizer for its actions in Nigeria 49 , and such boycotts are extremely unlikely. 50 Tragically, however, many Nigerians are now boycotting lifesaving polio vaccinations out of a generalized fear of Western medicine. 51 Another counterargument is that shareholders may prefer to limit director discretion for fear that directors will abuse that discretion and increase agency costs. That is, once directors are authorized not to kill children for loose change, they will use that authority to donate the corporate treasury to their alma mater. This argument is unpersuasive for three reasons.
First, this is actually an argument against discretion generally. Any action the director could take under the guise of social values, she could already take under the guise of 46 Id. 47 Id. 49 There are currently various calls for boycotts of Pfizer for a variety issues, but we could find no serious efforts to create a boycott based on this issue or any signs of changes in consumer spending habits. 50 Boycotts of pharmaceutical companies are extremely unlikely because the cost of substitution is so high. Often there are fewer substitutes for drugs than there are for, say, chicken sandwiches. A rational consumer boycotting a chicken sandwich company must value the moral objection and its expected return more than she values the cost of substituting the chicken sandwich for, say, a Big Mac. The Big Mac may be slightly more expensive or less appealing, but it is a minor cost that a consumer may be willing to bear to make a moral point. In contrast, a rational consumer boycotting a drug company must value her health less than her moral sensibilities. We may be willing to boycott sandwiches or even Botox injections, but we are unlikely to give up our cancer treatments. Because the individual boycotter suffers the full cost of boycotting the drugs but offers only nominal opposition to the drug company, such a boycott would likely be irrational to even the most morally outraged consumer. business discretion. 52 Because directors already have near unfettered discretion, recognizing social and moral norms recognizing broader shareholder interests will not grant them any power to pilfer from the corporate treasury that they do not already have. Second, it is also unlikely to change the effectiveness of the various controls on agency costs. Various corporate governance and market pressures already pressure a director to reduce her agency costs. If the director is already limited by these pressures, she will not be able to expand her agency costs further. If she is not at the limits of these pressures, she can expand her agency costs regardless of whether discretion of social and moral norms is granted. 53 Third, even assuming a self-serving director could increase agency costs somewhat, this may still be preferable. Returning to our example, suppose the international drug test would cost 50 additional lives and save only $2. Suppose further that if we allow director discretion, the 50 lives will be spared, we will forfeit the $2 savings, and the director will abuse her discretion by donating $5 to her alma mater. Shareholders may still consider this $7 cost acceptable to save 50 lives, even though it has increased agency costs. 54 Another counterargument is that shareholders have such varied interests that allowing consideration of nonfinancial interests quickly becomes unworkable. Some shareholders will want to protect the environment, some will want to donate to cancer research, and others will want to buy only locally grown, sustainable, organic, non-GMO, fair trade, whole grain products for the employee cafeteria. If we allow directors to consider each of these nonfinancial interests, whose interests do we choose? Shareholders may not want directors to consider nonfinancial interests because directors may consider interests the shareholder doesn't care about.
It's true that directors may reach the wrong balance, but this is not sufficient reason to entirely neglect moral and social interests. The most likely result is Tiebout sorting. 55 That is, shareholders that value environmental interests will be willing to pay a premium for environmentally friendly directors. Those that place little value on environmental interests will sell, transferring their holdings to a corporation that better aligns with their financial and nonfinancial preferences. Over time, as directors show preferences for one social or moral issue, the shareholder base will come to reflect the values of the directors, that is, to the extent the directors' moral preferences have any noticeable effect. 56 52 Again, there may be some slight additional restrictions in the takeover context, but these typically happen only once per corporate life, if at all, so it is not a strong reason to eliminate all discretion over social and moral norms. In addition, directors are capable of performing the appropriate balance. First, as discussed in Part II.C.1., below, the empirical evidence suggests that directors are already balancing nonfinancial interests; recognizing that they make these balances merely brings the theory in line with practice. Second, directors already have broad experience balancing a range of financial interests-whether to seek long-term or short-term growth, whether to take high or low risk investments. 57 Most directors are already well equipped to balance competing interests. Third, as a final line of defense, shareholders have the ability to remove directors that are inept at balancing. Directors are elected at the will of shareholders. If a director consistently reaches the wrong outcomes, she will be replaced and the course will be corrected. 58 Because shareholders value nonfinancial interests, and because granting discretion over these interests will likely not increase agency costs, in a hypothetical bargain with other stakeholders, shareholders would negotiate to allow directors to consider their financial and nonfinancial interests. Granted, in most situations this will require directors to maximize profits, but in each situation directors must consider the social and moral consequences. 59 
Director Interests
The prior subsection has shown that shareholders would likely negotiate for a norm that prioritized shareholder profits but still allowed directors to consider the shareholders' moral and social norms. We now turn to what the directors would negotiate for.
More practically-minded directors are likely to accept any corporate governance rule the shareholders want in exchange for the business judgment rule, which directors would likely find both necessary and sufficient. 60 In support of the shareholder wealth maximization norm, it has been argued that directors will prefer shareholder wealth maximization because any other alternative would 59 Milton Friedman, no friend to using corporate funds for social issues, even implicitly acknowledged this result. In his article, he condemned social responsibility, but only after he defined social responsibility to exclude actions that were in the shareholders' interests. If the shareholders valued the action, even Milton Friedman would support it.
What does it mean to say that the corporate executive has a 'social responsibility' in his capacity as businessman? If this statement is not pure rhetoric, it must mean that he is to act in some way that is not in the interest of his employers. . . . The executive is exercising a distinct 'social responsibility' . . . only if he spends the money in a different way than they would have spent it. lower share prices and increase the cost of equity capital, which would increase the likelihood of firm failure or takeover. 61 Takeovers harm directors personally by damaging their reputation, reducing the value of their firm-specific human capital, and damaging their self-esteem in doing a job well. 62 This argument is based on a questionable premise: that considering nonfinancial interests will lower share prices. This assumes that any additional risk created by considering nonfinancial interests will outweigh the benefit shareholders see in considering these nonfinancial interests. That is, if shareholders value some social issue more than profits, then taking account of that social issue will increase, not decrease, the share price. Therefore, consideration of moral and social norms, if done in accordance with shareholder preferences, decreases the cost of equity capital. As discussed in Part V, there is considerable evidence that shareholders are willing to accept lower returns in exchange for promotion of their non-financial interests. The limits on what they are willing to accept will vary across firms, but a director that properly values all of the shareholders' interests will increase the demand for shares and the share price, which will reduce capital costs. This will reduce the risk of takeovers, which will increase the returns on the directors' firm specific human capital investment, improve the directors' reputations and improve the value of their stock-based compensation.
But even if accounting for social or moral norms lowered the stock price, there are additional reasons why directors may prefer such a norm. First, as discussed in Part V.B., below, directors are human; most place some value on moral and social norms and would be willing to work for lower salaries to further causes they believe in. Because most directors are willing to make some level of financial concessions to promote social and moral causes, they would prefer a norm that allowed them to do what they think shareholders would deem as right. This willingness leaves room to negotiate for a norm that accounts for social and moral interests.
61 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, 41 ("At the margins, a higher cost of capital increases the probability of firm failure or takeover"). It is not clear why cost of capital through equity sales is the relevant cost in this argument, at least as far as it addresses firm failure. For example, if directors maximized the interests of employees, rather than shareholders, they could lower labor costs. And while dividends are typically discretionary, wages are not, which implies that in tough times wages are more likely to push a firm to fail. The bankruptcy code does not even allow shareholders to file for involuntary bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (allowing claim holders, rather than interest holders, to file for involuntary bankruptcy).
This claim is also empirically suspect because over the last decade firms are much more likely to repurchase stock from shareholders than to sell it to them. See Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV. July-Aug. 2012, at 2 ("Net issuance of corporate equity in the U.S. over the past decade has been negative $287 billion, according to the Federal Reserve. . . . Factor in dividend payments, and we find a multi-trillion-dollar transfer of cash from U.S. corporations to their shareholders over the past 10 years. Established corporations tend to finance investments out of retained earnings or borrowed money. They don't need shareholders' cash."). Where that is the case, the cost of equity is not very relevant. See also Bainbridge, Director Primacy, at 52 ("Some firms go for years without seeking equity investments. If these firms' boards disregard shareholder interests, shareholders have little recourse other than to sell out at prices that will reflect the board's lack of concern for shareholder wealth. In contrast, few firms can survive for long without regular infusions of new employees and new debt.").
Second, directors are more involved than shareholders in any inhumane action the corporation carries out. Because directors are less removed from the bad act, they are less morally shielded from social or moral costs (i.e., guilt or shame). Directors are likely to negotiate for a system that allows them to consider alternatives to reduce these costs, which they often bear more acutely than shareholders.
One counterargument is that directors may prefer the shareholder wealth maximization norm because they do not want another factor to consider. They may believe that the information and decision costs associated with considering moral and social norms outweigh the benefits.
This seems unlikely. As explained in Part V.B., directors already act on moral and social norms-our theories just pretend that they do not. Under the profit maximization norm directors are required to invent Rube-Goldberg-like explanations for how doing what's right will increase profits. Under a system that allows them to do what is right because it is right, they can save the costs of justifying why the action increases profits. They short-circuit the longer decision path, which may reduce decision costs. In addition, it may require more mental exertion to pretend they are not aware of certain social and moral consequences than it would to just consider those consequences in the balance. Where this is the case, information costs are reduced by considering moral and social norms.
Directors engaged in a hypothetical bargain would prefer a norm that allowed them to consider the moral and social interests of the shareholders. As long as the shareholders are happy, the directors are likely to improve their reputations and compensation. Because of this, in a hypothetical negotiation, directors are likely to prefer a rule that allows consideration of shareholders' moral and social interests.
Other Stakeholder Interests
Next we turn to the corporation's other stakeholders. The category of other stakeholders includes those that are protected by contracts and those that are not. Stakeholders with contracts include consumers, suppliers, employees, independent contractors and debt holders. Stakeholders without contracts include tort victims, local municipalities and those that share environmental resources with the firm, for example, kids who play downriver from the factory.
For stakeholders with contracts, there is little need for a hypothetical negotiation. They have an actual negotiation when they become stakeholders. 63 Because they will negotiate their own protections, they would likely prefer as wide a negotiation field as possible to search for mutual gains from trade. This suggests that contractual stakeholders would prefer a norm that allowed directors to consider moral and social norms because such a norm would broaden the field of the negotiation.
One might argue that many employees or customers do not negotiate before becoming stakeholders, so this is an unrealistic assumption. While market forces supply some of the negotiation on their behalf, relying on the market isn't necessary for our purposes. Both groups would prefer a norm that allowed directors to consider social and moral norms.
Under the shareholder wealth maximization norm, employees should not be paid one cent above their market rate. Allowing consideration of social norms may allow them to earn higher wages. Likewise, the shareholder wealth maximization norm means products should only be as safe as necessary to maximize profits. Consumers will prefer a norm that allows directors to consider the moral consequences of reduced safety. 64 Stakeholders without contracts would also likely prefer a norm that allowed directors to consider moral and social norms because it would give them additional chances for protection. A local community would prefer the directors to consider the social norms of dealing with a community. Children playing downstream would prefer for directors to consider whether dumping sludge in the river violates moral norms, even if dumping complies with law. And tort victims would likely prefer that directors consider the moral and social consequences of their safety programs, beyond the minimums required by law.
One counterargument is that profit maximization may benefit local communities by raising tax revenues, creating more employment, and even resulting in larger corporate reserves to satisfy tort judgments. This is a reasonable argument, but it is internally inconsistent. While a corporation with strong profits has stronger capacity to stay in the community despite higher tax rates or to offer steady employment, this capacity will not be used unless doing so is profit maximizing. A director that only maximizes profits is limited in her ability to pass along the benefits of stable profits to employees, either through wages or job security.
Likewise, tort claimants are likely to find that maximizing shareholder wealth means maximizing the actual wealth of the shareholders, rather than leaving that wealth resting in the corporate treasury. This means distributing corporate reserves to shareholders through dividends and stock repurchases. Recall that the most famous case extolling shareholder wealth maximization successfully reduced the size of Ford's corporate reserves. 65 There is no reason to think that either contractual or non-contractual, non-shareholder stakeholders would prefer a shareholder wealth maximization norm over a norm that allowed directors to consider shareholders' moral and social interests.
Summary of the Hypothetical Bargain Analysis
In a hypothetical bargain between the various constituencies it is likely that shareholders would prefer a norm that allowed consideration of their nonfinancial interests because those interests affect their utility. Directors are likely to care primarily about the business judgment rule, but would also support consideration of the shareholders' nonfinancial interests because it reduces their moral and social costs and because satisfying shareholders increases share prices, which provides job security, increased compensation and benefits to their reputations. Other stakeholders are also likely to support this outcome 64 An infamous example of financial calculations without consideration of moral issues is the Ford Pinto. Ford sold a car prone to explode rather than install an $11 fix. The decision was based on crash testing (which revealed the problem) compliant with federal law, and a financial cost-benefit financial analysis developed by a federal agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Association. The projected costs of human burns and fatalities was calculated to be about a third the cost of installing the $11 part on all of the Pinto automobiles. Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed Opportunities, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 379-89 (1992).
because it expands the range of any negotiation and may allow them to capture the benefits of any social and moral norms.
B. The Principal-Agent Model
While the nexus of contracts model of the corporation has enamored most of the academy, 66 it is still common to see arguments premised on the idea of an agent-principal relationship between directors and shareholders. 67 Under an agency model, shareholders are seen as owners of the corporation, with directors or managers acting as their agents to look after their interests. Nothing in law requires an agent to consider only the financial interests of their principals. In fact, proper consideration of a broad range of interests can actually increase the principal's total utility.
A brief example may illustrate the point. Suppose that your favorite kindergartener is selling homemade lemonade for a nickel and you ask us, as your agents, to go next door to get you a cup. Rather than pay the five cent asking price, we ridicule the girl, her poorlymade lemonade stand and her ugly pigtails until she cries, "Just take the lemonade! I don't care anymore!" and runs inside. We then help ourselves to free cups and proudly return to you with both lemonade and nickel.
We have maximized your wealth, but not your total welfare. The small financial gain is offset by the damage to your relationship and your other moral and social interests. By maximizing your financial interests to the exclusion of your social interests we lowered your total utility and served as an inefficient agent.
Institutional investors may not be concerned about whether the kindergartener next door likes them, but the same principles apply. There is some point at which shareholder interests are best served by rejecting profit maximization.
Take, for example, the scenario described in Part III.A., above, regarding drug trials conducted overseas to avoid regulation. Recall that these reduced regulatory protections will result in lower costs, but more deaths. A shareholder may be willing to tolerate a few deaths for large savings, but may be unwilling to tolerate many deaths for small savings. An effective agent must act in accordance with all of the shareholders' interests or the agent may decrease the shareholders' total welfare.
Because an agent is effective only to the degree she considers all of the principal's relevant interests, the agent-principal model of the corporation supports allowing directors to consider shareholders' nonfinancial interests. 
C. A Few Counterarguments
There are a few remaining counterarguments that are commonly employed against proposals to consider interests other than pure wealth maximization. This section will address the role of law, the survival of the firm and the two masters problem.
The Role of Law
One might argue that directors need not consider nonfinancial interests because any nonfinancial interest that is generally agreed upon is already protected by general and targeted public welfare laws. This argument fails because these laws may not match the preferences of shareholders, the laws are incomplete, the laws are subject to governmental inefficiencies and laws change over jurisdictions and time.
First, a perfectly functioning democratic government reflects the interests of all its citizens, which may differ systematically from the interests of the shareholders. For example, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., was recently recognized by the Supreme Court as having interests that differed from the nonfinancial interests embodied by certain regulations. 68 At times the law will allow an exemption for such preferences, as the Supreme Court held, but often it will not. Laws may provide an outer bound to decision making, but idiosyncrasies of a particular group of shareholders may mean those boundaries are too permissive.
A second, related problem is due to bounded rationality and the costs of negotiating an infinitely complex set of laws. Even if the nonfinancial interests of shareholders perfectly align with those of society, laws will be incomplete. 69 Courts are inadequate mechanisms to fill these gaps because judges are not well equipped to make business decisions, few decisions will be subject to judicial review, judicial decisions typically come only after the decision has been made, and the costs of litigating a reversal would be borne by shareholders. Without discretion to consider nonfinancial interests, directors' actions will not be able to fill the gaps relating to nonfinancial interests. This will lead to inefficient resource allocations.
Third, no democracy perfectly aligns with the majority's preferences. The law is subject to horse trading, regulatory capture, opportunism and special interest pressures. These make it unlikely that laws reflect the interests of society generally, let alone the interests of shareholders in a particular corporation.
Fourth, laws change and corporations are international. The social and moral norms in the United States may be very different than the norms in Brazil or Zaire. As Einer Elhauge points out, "before 1924, slavery was legal in the Sudan and not yet prohibited by international law." 70 The law cannot be a sufficient safeguard for moral and social norms because it would require shareholders in one country to yield decision power over their moral and social interests to voters in another country when engaging in global commerce. 71 Even if our morals align with international laws now, these laws are subject to change without our input.
For these reasons, law is not a sufficient mechanism to protect shareholders' moral and social interests.
Survival of the Firm
A common justification for the shareholder wealth maximization norm is that "[w]here competitors are numerous and entry is easy, persistent departures from profit maximizing behavior inexorably leads to extinction." 72 That is, nice corporations finish last. There are three responses to this.
First, as a practical matter, self-interested directors are unlikely to knowingly take actions that will cause them to lose their jobs except in extreme circumstances. If following shareholders' nonfinancial interests is unprofitable, directors are more likely to err on the side of profit maximization so as to avoid being put out of work. In other words, as Einer Elhauge pointed out, this critique is a restraint on the pursuit of nonfinancial interests, rather than a reason to disallow it. 73 Second, focusing on constituents other than shareholders sounds more like a formula for success than failure. As discussed further below, craigslist.org, a classified listings website, puts its customers and community before profits, a practice that made it the world leader in its industry. 74 Treating customers and employees as the top priority is now such common business advice it's become clichéd.
Third, in the rare instance where directors are faithfully following the shareholders' interests and the shareholders' nonfinancial interests lead to insolvency, it's not clear why we should intervene. In insolvency, the shareholders are the lowest in priority, behind the claims of creditors, employees and suppliers. If the shareholders are willing to sacrifice their entire stake to do what they feel is right (a very unlikely result), is it our business to stop them? To force them to take an action they find morally repugnant in order to prevent bankruptcy?
If so, we've proven too much. If we can prohibit corporations from going insolvent for moral reasons, why not for business reasons as well? Why allow corporations to engage in high risk activities or activities that pay off only in the extreme long-run? There would be little left of corporate law if we sought to protect corporations from insolvency. While selfimposed, morally-based insolvency seems extremely unlikely, it does not seem like something we should prohibit.
Another concern might be that deviating from profit maximization harms minority shareholders that would have preferred more profit maximizing actions, but this is merely a baseline problem. Minority shareholders that want pure profit maximization may have lower returns if pure profit maximization isn't required. But the remaining shareholders 71 There are examples of domestic laws that prohibit conduct by companies outside of the United States, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. These laws are typically the exception to the rule. 72 face moral and social costs if pure profit maximization is required. So this is a cost allocation problem that can be determined by the board of directors and need not be decided a priori by the courts. . 75 Shareholder wealth maximization cannot be defended on the grounds that other systems lead to insolvency because such deviations are unlikely in the face of market pressures, are likely to be profitable, and are rightfully within the shareholders' prerogatives.
The Two Masters Problem
Another justification for the shareholder wealth maximization norm is the "two masters" problem, a term coined by Professor Bainbridge in his insightful debate with Prof. Green. 76 The argument is that if directors are required to consider multiple goals, they will not have a determinate guide for decision making. Michael C. Jensen summarized the argument saying, "since it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a single valued objective function." 77 While effective against some stakeholder theories, the two masters argument is a weak critique of the broad shareholder value norm. Under the broad shareholder value norm directors remain accountable to only one constituency: the shareholders. Deviations from shareholder wealth maximization occur only when doing so serves the shareholders' moral or social interests. There is still only one master.
Likewise the critique is weak against the broad shareholder value norm because even maximizing shareholder value requires balancing several competing interests, effectively maximizing in more than one dimension. 78 Public corporations have thousands of shareholders that define "long-term" in different ways. For you it may be when you retire; for me when my kids reach college. 79 The two masters problem appears as soon as the Either you will hate the one and love the other, or you will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve both God and money."). It is wonderful irony that this scripture is used to argue that directors should consider only profits and not moral or social consequences. 77 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function 1 (Oct. 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=220671; see also id. at 10-11 ("[T]elling a manager to maximize current profits, market share, future growth in profits, and anything else one pleases will leave that manager with no way to make a reasoned decision. In effect, it leaves the manager with no objective. The result will be confusion and a lack of purpose that will handicap the firm in its competition for survival."); see also Greg McKeown, ESSENTIALISM 49-57 (2014); Bainbridge, Director Primacy, at 41 ("Because stakeholder decision making models necessarily create a two masters problem, such models inevitably lead to indeterminate results."), 42 ("Directors who are responsible to everyone are accountable to no one.").
board is required to define "long-term." 80 Directors are also required to consider our differing risk preferences and perhaps our diversification. It's unpersuasive to argue that directors can manage several financial interests at once, but adding any nonfinancial interests would leave them without direction.
To the extent the two masters problem relates to serving multiple constituencies, it does not apply to the broad shareholder value norm, which serves only shareholders. To the extent it relates to serving multiple interests, it is a difference of degree, not of kind, from the shareholder wealth maximization norm, and there is no reason to suggest that this difference in degree will hamper the directors' performance.
PART IV. THE BROAD SHAREHOLDER VALUE NORM BETTER CONFORMS WITH THE LAW
Part III showed how the broad shareholder value norm improves upon the theoretical underpinnings of the shareholder wealth maximization norm. This part shows that the broad shareholder value norm also resolves the weaknesses of stakeholder theories in the case law.
This article will focus on the most challenging cases for the various theories: 81 At first glance, these cases seem to require shareholder wealth maximization, and the counter arguments scholars have proposed are incomplete at best. We argue that these cases stand for the proposition that Delaware courts will not recognize a moral interest in determining who has the proper character to own stock in a Delaware corporation.
This part begins with an introduction to the business judgment rule and how it creates ambiguity in corporate purpose cases. We then analyze the two major cases in turn.
A. The Business Judgment Rule
All discussions of corporate purpose are necessarily in the shadow of the business judgment rule, which often leaves rulings on corporate purpose ambiguous. "The rule itself 'is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.'" 82 In practice, this means courts will not second guess a business decision under most circumstances. If the decision is the product of a business judgment, then courts will not analyze whether it was the right decision.
(continued….) change with every trade, making it at best a range. And if it is a range, what is to be done to decide between competing points in the range? Using a weighted average expected sales date, even if possible in theory, would not completely eliminate the two masters problem. It would also likely have the unfortunate result of skewing toward short-term objectives.
When analyzing most business decisions, courts apply the business judgment rule before considering whether directors maximized shareholder wealth. The business judgment rule is typically dispositive of the case, which cuts off any analysis discussing shareholder wealth maximization. Discussions that are provided are dicta.
However, when there are active bidders attempting to acquire the corporation and it becomes clear that the corporation will be sold, there are additional prerequisites before the business judgment rule applies. 83 Because of this, takeover cases provide the clearest statements of corporate purpose and have proved the most difficult for scholars to circumvent. We discuss the leading takeover cases here. 85 In contrast, brilliant scholars, such as Lynn Stout, have argued that Revlon is merely the "exception that proves the rule," and provides little practical limit on directors wishing to consider non-shareholder interests. 86 The following sections offer a new interpretation that does not preclude moral considerations and does not require consideration of nonshareholders' interests. Rather, we show that the cases merely establish that courts will not recognize a purported moral interest in determining who has the proper character to own stock.
B.

Facts
In Revlon, a firm was to be sold to either a hostile corporate raider or a party that was friendly to the board. The board supported the friendly bidder, in part because doing so would eliminate the directors' potential liability to noteholders.
It began when the board learned of an impending hostile tender offer by the corporate raider. 87 Advisers informed the board that the company as a whole was worth around $55 per share, but if the company was broken up and sold, the pieces would be worth around $60 to $70 per share. 88 Hoping to avoid a breakup, the board authorized two defensives. First, it repurchased some of its outstanding shares, thereby raising the share price. 89 Second, it adopted a poison pill, which would saddle the company with large amounts of debt unless the acquirer paid at least $65 per share. 89 
Id.
The hostile bidder offered $47.50 per share. 90 The board urged its shareholders to reject the bid and issued debt in the form of notes as part of an exchange offer. The notes had a covenant that prevented certain asset sales, which would make it more difficult to break up the company. 91 The bidding continued, and the board began negotiating with a friendly bidder. 92 The friendly bidder offered $56 per share if the board waived the covenants in the notes, a move that severely decreased the notes' value and led some noteholders to threaten to sue the directors. The board accepted the friendly bidder's offer. 93 The hostile raider topped the bid and promised to top any future bid the friendly bidder made. 94 The friendly bidder raised its bid to $57.25, and the board again agreed. This time the agreement included a "no-shop provision," which would prohibit the board from soliciting offers from other bidders, a $25 million break-up fee if the deal wasn't completed with the friendly bidder, and a provision that would allow the friendly bidder to purchase some of the company's divisions at a deep discount if another bidder won. In exchange, the friendly bidder also agreed to support the notes at par value, which would likely keep the noteholders from suing the directors.
The hostile bidder sued. The Delaware Court of Chancery enjoined the asset transfer and the board's tactics, and the Delaware Supreme Court heard an expedited interlocutory appeal. 95 
Analysis
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the adoption of the poison pill and the share repurchase were reasonable responses to the perceived inadequacy of the bid. 96 However, once there was a live auction with topping bids, it became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable. . . . The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the board's responsibilities . . . . It no longer faced threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive measures became moot. The directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company. 97 90 Id. 91 Id. 92 Id. 93 Id. 94 Id. at 178. 95 Id. 96 Id. at 181. 97 Id. at 182.
The court also condemned the directors for requiring the friendly bidder to support the notes at par value, a move the court saw as a naked attempt to avoid being sued. 98 In its defense, the board argued that it could consider the interests of other constituencies, including the noteholders, so supporting the notes was a proper use of their discretion. 99 The court disagreed.
A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders. However, such concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder. 100
"The Notes were accepted by the holders on [the] basis [that the covenants might be waived] . . . . Thus, nothing remained for Revlon to legitimately protect and no rationally related benefit thereby accrued to the stockholders." 101 Proponents of shareholder wealth maximization frequently cite these statements to show that, at least in the takeover context, wealth maximization is required. Chief Justice Strine recently wrote, "Revlon settled the question as a practical matter in Delaware, by making clear that other corporate constituencies may only be considered instrumentally in terms of their relationship to creating profits for shareholders." 102 Others, such as Prof. Stout, have argued that the case does not broadly require companies to maximize shareholder wealth because it applies only when a takeover is imminent, that is, when a public company is about to stop being a public company. 103 However, even if she is correct, this doesn't explain why the rules would change in that situation-nor does it neatly cover takeover situations where ownership is switching from one majority shareholder group to another, or from one parent corporation to another. If social and moral norms are worth considering in the daily operation of the company, why are they not worth considering when the company is making its most important decision, whether to continue its existence?
The broad shareholder value norm provides an answer. It is not that moral and social norms cannot be considered; it is that there are no actionable moral or social norms at issue.
The case establishes that the board's actions must have "rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders." 104 interests? The directors are not making a decision about whether to pollute the environment or how well to treat employees. They are deciding who gets to own shares of the company, or more specifically, to whom might other shareholders sell their shares. If the question is purely one of ownership, what moral interest could shareholders have? Future decisions about whether to break up the company will be made under the moral and social norms of the new owners, and if those morals violate some rule there can be a suit at that point, when the claim is ripe. But recognizing a shareholder's moral interest in who can or cannot own shares would effectively allow shareholders to claim a moral interest in deciding who has the proper character to own stock, which would be a troubling precedent. 105 One counter argument is that this is more than just about ownership because the bidder was a hostile raider. The bidder planned to break up the company, which could harm local communities and employees, and shareholders may have moral interests in protecting these groups. It is not an objection to the raider's ownership; it is an objection to the raider's intentions. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, the duties outlined above only took effect once "it became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable." 106 Recall that the court approved the use of the poison pill and the share repurchase, which the board adopted before the friendly bidder entered the story. The board's actions crossed the line only when it was clear that breakup was inevitable. "The original threat posed by [the hostile bidder]-the break-up of the company-had become reality which even the directors embraced." 107 So it is difficult to argue that the decision here was to protect employees or communities because a win by either bidder would result in breaking up the company. Again, the only decision was who would own the company, and the court is right to disregard any moral interests in who has the proper character to own stock.
Second, even if the hostile bidder planned to sell off the divisions, it is again, nothing more than a change in ownership of those divisions. Decisions about what to do with employees of those divisions will be made in accordance with the interests of the new owners, and a challenge about what the bidder might do once the company is acquired is not yet ripe for adjudication.
Another counterargument is that here the court rejected a deal that would have taken care of another constituency, the noteholders. By rejecting the benefit to the noteholders, the court could be said to have rejected any moral or social interest the shareholders felt in helping the noteholders.
However, no one claimed that the shareholders had any interest in helping the noteholders at their own expense. Because no one argued the existence of the shareholders' social or moral interest in helping the noteholders, the court had no basis to invent one. 105 One might ask if this is consistent with the court's statement in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985), stating that a board can act to prevent "a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness . . . because of another person's stock ownership." 493 A.2d at 955. This statement could be understood to mean that mere stock ownership is something a person may morally object to. The next case, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010), routes that understanding, holding that courts will not allow a board to defend shareholders' alleged moral interest in who has the proper character to own stock.
Revlon as an Evidentiary Rule: The Unjust Steward
There is another common sense reason why the wealth maximization may be required in the takeover context but not in daily decision-making. The rule in Revlon may be seen as an evidentiary rule. Because of the extreme facts in a takeover context, courts may require a greater showing of the shareholders' nonfinancial interest. This "last stage" problem was examined nearly two thousand years ago, in the parable of the unjust steward. There a steward, knowing he was about to lose his job, forgave large portions of debts owed to his master with the hope of buying the favor of the forgiven parties. 108 Similarly, modern game theory predicts that players are more likely to defect in the last stage of a repeat game because they will not face repercussions in subsequent rounds.
In a takeover context, directors are soon to be out of work, so there is a heightened risk that they will unjustly transfer shareholder wealth to other constituencies to benefit themselves, and such an action would be more difficult to detect because the director's benefit is nebulously indirect. Because of these risks, once a takeover is inevitable courts may require stronger evidence that acts benefiting non-shareholders are actually in the true interests (moral or otherwise) of shareholders. Perhaps no amount of evidence could overcome the presumption that these acts are merely attempts by directors to gain favor with other constituencies. This would merely recognize that directors are better at creating false business justifications than courts are at unraveling the insincerity of these justifications. This would justify a reading of Revlon that allowed only financial considerations in the context of an imminent takeover-recognizing the heightened risks and their own limitations on determining business purposes-but still allowed shareholders' nonfinancial interest to be considered in less risky scenarios.
Revlon Summary
Revlon supports two propositions. First, when a sale is inevitable, the central decision being made is who will own the company. Second, courts will not recognize shareholder interests about who has the proper character to own shares. Because there are no recognizable nonfinancial interests, directors are required to maximize financial interests. In addition, during a takeover there are greater incentives for directors to transfer wealth away from shareholders to buy favor with other constituencies in their own self-interest. Courts may simply require heightened evidentiary standards or prohibit consideration of nonfinancial interests altogether within the takeover context. 109 C. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark is the latest case in the debate over corporate purpose. 110 This case involved craigslist.org, a classifieds website that quickly rose to become the most used classified listing site in the United States. 111 Despite its success, craigslist's directors had no intention of monetizing the site to maximize profits-the site did not charge for most listings, and it did not accept third-party advertising. 112 There were three shareholders, who each held a board seat. Craig Newmark was the chairman and founder; he held 42.6% of the company. 113 James "Jim" Buckmaster, the CEO and president, held 29%. And eBay, an online auction platform, held 28.4%. 114 In contrast to craigslist, eBay was keen on monetizing everything. 115 It acquired its shares from a disaffected director of craigslist, who had become disaffected precisely because he was unable to persuade Craig and Jim to monetize the site. 116 eBay believed it could succeed where this director had failed and bought the shares with the goal of eventually acquiring Craig's and Jim's shares and monetizing the site. 117 In connection with eBay's acquisition of the shares, eBay, Jim and Craig entered into an agreement by which eBay would pay $8 million each to Craig and Jim in exchange for various minority shareholder protections. 118 Among these protections was the continuation of cumulative voting, which would give eBay the power to elect one director. eBay also gained certain "consent rights" to block share issuances, certain dilutive transactions and charter amendments that would adversely affect eBay. The agreement imposed confidentiality restrictions on eBay and gave each of eBay, Craig and Jim preemptive rights to purchase shares in any new share issuance and a right of first refusal on each other's shares. Importantly, the agreement expressly gave eBay the right to compete, subject to certain consequences. 119 If eBay chose to compete with craigslist in the United States, it would lose (1) its consent rights, which covered share issuances, dilutive transactions and charter amendments, (2) its preemptive rights to purchase shares in new issuances, and (3) its rights of first refusal of Jim and Craig's shares. Jim and Craig would also lose their rights of first refusal over eBay's shares, but not their rights of first refusal against each other. 120 For the next three years, eBay continually tried to monetize or acquire craigslist, and Jim and Craig continually rebuffed eBay's advances. 121 During this time eBay routinely used 111 Id. at 7. 112 Id. at 8. 113 Id. at 25. These figures are before any of the attacks on eBay began. By the time of suit, Craig and Jim had diluted eBay down about 3.5%, which went to Jim (1.4%) and Craig (2.1%). 114 Id. 115 Id. at 9. 116 Id. at 9-10. 117 Id. at 10. 118 Id. at 11. 119 Id. at 11-12. 120 Id. at 12-13. 121 Id. at 14-16.
craigslist's confidential information, in violation of its confidentiality restrictions. 122 eBay used this information to create a competitor to craigslist called Kijiji, 123 which operated outside the United States.
Nearly three years after taking its initial investment, eBay launched Kijiji in the United States, triggering the competition consequences. 124 eBay's director, who also ran Kijiji in Europe, resigned the following week, and although eBay selected a new director, Jim and Craig never seated him. 125 Jim and Craig immediately began planning how to force eBay to sell its stock, 126 implementing three measures to push eBay out. 127 First, they instituted a staggered board, meaning that only one director would be elected each year. 128 This made eBay's cumulative voting power useless because with only one available seat each year, there was nothing to cumulate. Jim and Craig now had full control over board elections.
Second, they instituted a poison pill, which would be trigged (1) if Jim, Craig or eBay acquired 0.01% of additional craigslist stock, or (2) if someone other than Jim, Craig or eBay acquired 15% of craigslist's outstanding shares. 129 eBay owned about 25% of the outstanding shares, which meant it could not sell its holdings to a single buyer. The board retained power to waive any trigger event, and Jim and Craig controlled the board, so these measures primarily affected eBay. 130 Third, the company offered additional shares to shareholders that granted the company a right of first refusal over their shares. 131 Jim and Craig's shares already had a right of first refusal on each other's shares, so they had little to lose by entering this agreement and boosting their percent ownership 1.4% and 2.1%, respectively. 132 In contrast, eBay's shares were freely tradable; entering this agreement would have encumbered them, so it suffered a 3.5% dilution to avoid the encumbrance. 133 In response to these three measures, eBay sued Jim and Craig for breaching their fiduciary duties as directors and as majority shareholders. 134 Chancellor Chandler delivered his opinion after a nine-day trial.
Turning first to the poison pill, the court applied the Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. standard, which requires (1) a reasonably perceived threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, and (2) that the poison pill be proportional to the threat. 135 On the first prong, Jim and Craig argued that if they died, their heirs might sell their shares to eBay, who would "fundamentally alter craigslist's values, culture and business model, including departing from [craigslist's] public-service mission in favor of increased monetization of craigslist." 136 The court rejected this argument, finding instead that "Jim and Craig resented eBay's decision to compete with craigslist and adopted the Rights Plan as a punitive response. They then cloaked this decision in the language of culture and post mortem corporate benefit." 137 With the court's holding that this is about punishment, not protection, it's hard to see this as anything other than a minority oppression claim. "Jim and Craig are not dispersed, disempowered, or vulnerable stockholders. They are the majority." 138 They can approve or reject any transaction they want; they can elect themselves directors without anyone else's vote; their response brief literally argued that the only way eBay could do anything was over Jim or Craig's dead body. 139 As the court held, this was not protection. This was punishment, which is a clear violation of the duty of loyalty. 140 Still, the dicta supporting shareholder wealth maximization is worth reproducing here, because it is particularly strongly worded.
The court eases in to profit maximization, saying that "[p]romoting, protecting, or pursuing non-stockholder considerations must lead at some point to value for stockholders." 141 Nothing in this statement prohibits promoting nonfinancial value for stockholders, so this is consistent with the broad shareholder value norm.
The court continues:
As an abstract matter, there is nothing inappropriate about an organization seeking to aid local, national, and global communities by providing a website for online classifieds that is largely devoid of monetized elements. Indeed, I personally appreciate and admire Jim's and Craig's desire to be of service to communities. The corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment. Jim and Craig opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted millions of dollars from eBay as part of a transaction whereby eBay became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. The "Inc." after the company name has to mean at least that. Thus, I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders-no matter whether those stockholders are individuals of modest means or a corporate titan of online commerce. If Jim and Craig were the only stockholders affected by their decisions, then there would be no one to object. eBay, however, holds a significant stake in craigslist, and Jim and Craig's actions affect others besides themselves. 142 Breaking this down a bit, the requirement that they "promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders" is fully consistent with the broad shareholder value norm, which requires directors to run the corporation for the benefit of shareholders. Next, the court said it "cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders." The next two lines show that this is just strongly worded dicta and that the real issue is that majority shareholders are using their power to oppress a minority shareholder-a minority shareholder that happens to be primarily concerned with its economic value rather than its social or moral values. The court says, "If Jim and Craig were the only stockholders affected by their decisions, then there would be no one to object. eBay, however, holds a significant stake in craigslist, and Jim and Craig's actions affect others besides themselves." 143 In other words, Jim and Craig would have been free to do as they please had it not been to oppress eBay, a minority shareholder. It is, again, the minority oppression that troubles the court.
In addition, the same principles described under the analysis of Revlon above apply here. The court is not ruling on whether Jim and Craig had a proper corporate mission. The court did not require Jim and Craig to monetize the site; it ruled only on whether this poison pill was properly adopted. In that context, the only issue at stake is who can or cannot own shares without facing a penalty. Any changes to the corporate culture may or may not come in the future, but all that is being decided now is who can own shares of the company's stock. The concern here is even more distant than in Revlon. There, an actual corporate raider was climbing down the chimney; here, the directors were hogtying eBay under the guise of corporate culture, a culture which eBay had tried to change for three years without the slightest success. eBay posed no threat to the culture. It was ownership, not culture, that was at stake. As discussed in the analysis of Revlon above, the court is right to disregard any social or moral interest in who has the proper character to own stock. Owners do not need other owners to enforce their social or moral values with regards to assigning their ownership to others, because they are inherently in a position to do so themselves. Because there are no other interests supporting the poison pill, it was struck down.
Because this case is best understood as protecting a minority shareholder from oppression and because even in its strongest form it deals only with who has the proper character to own shares, this case is consistent with an understanding that directors can consider shareholders' nonfinancial interests.
PART V. THE BROAD SHAREHOLDER VALUE NORM CONFORMS WITH EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Part IV showed that the broad shareholder value norm overcomes the weaknesses stakeholder theories find in Delaware case law. This part shows that the norm also overcomes the weakness the shareholder wealth maximization norm finds in the empirical evidence. Shareholders value more than just profits and are willing to sacrifice wealth to promote moral and social norms even when engaging in financial transactions. Likewise, the shareholder wealth maximization norm does not accurately predict the behavior of directors and managers, who do not maximize shareholder wealth.
A. Shareholders Consider Conscience When Weighing Financial Decisions
Do shareholders weigh nonfinancial interests when engaging in economic transactions? There is strong evidence that they do.
One measure is the amount of money invested in "socially responsible" funds, which invest only in companies that meet certain moral or social guidelines. Modest investments in socially responsible funds are irrational regardless of one's views on the moral or social issues presented. A single investor's portfolio is unlikely to make any difference in the overall social issue, but that investor faces the full costs incurred by investing in a more restricted fund. 144 And those costs can be substantial.
Compare an investor seeking only profit with an investor that conscientiously abstains from investing in certain firms. 145 The socially conscious investor has fewer investment options, so he immediately faces greater risk for lack of diversification, assuming that the social principle aligns with some industry or national boundary. In contrast, the profit maximizer can invest in any firm that the conscientious investor can, but the conscientious investor cannot invest in all of the firms that the profit maximizer can. The conscientious investors' best case scenario is that the most profitable investments are within his investment sphere, but even then both investors can select them and their returns will be equal.
One study estimated the costs of limiting investments to socially responsible companies. 146 If an investor is building a portfolio comprised of 100 companies from the S&P 500 Index and eliminates 20% of those companies from consideration, the investor would lose around 0.17% per year. For an investment manager with $1.0 billion under management, these missed returns sum to $153 million over 20 years. 147 An empirical study on actual results found even greater losses, finding that socially conscious funds underperformed alternative investments by 3.6%. 148 So if social investing is on average less profitable (high cost), and if a single investor's decisions are unlikely to make any change in the social cause (low benefit), it is irrational for any investor to invest in socially responsible funds. But that is not what the data show.
In 2012, one out of nine dollars under professional management in the United States was invested in funds following socially responsible investment guidelines. 149 And this figure is growing. This was a 22% increase over the previous three years, and represents more than a 10% compound annual growth rate over 17 years. 150 In an anonymous survey of those managing the funds, 72% attributed the increase to client demand and to management's values. 151 Because it is irrational to invest any money in these funds, this figure undercounts the number of shareholders with social or moral interests.
Additional evidence of shareholder preferences comes from the marketing designed to sway investors. All but three of the Fortune 50 companies have published reports or websites demonstrating their social initiatives, which may include the environment, sustainability, treatment of employees or suppliers, community service, diversity or philanthropy. 152 Even if these efforts are a ploy, mere "greenwashing," 153 that 47 of the 50 largest companies in the United States do it is evidence that the ploy sways investors. It is possible that directors publish these reports merely to boast, but it seems an odd tactic to boast to the very people whose money they are presumably squandering. 154 The result does not change if we conclude these social initiative reports are designed to influence customers, employees or other non-shareholder constituencies, although the link is more attenuated. The marketing is useful only if customers, employees or other nonshareholder constituencies are making financial decisions based on the social actions of the firm. That is, they must be willing to accept higher prices, lower rents or inferior goods in order to support causes they believe in. Boycotts are a ready example of this behavior. 155 Because consumers and employees in one context are shareholders in another, evidence that these groups are willing to pay a premium or accept lower profits to satisfy their conscience in a financial transaction for wages or rents implies that they will be willing to make the same tradeoff when acting as a shareholder. That is, if they are willing to sacrifice dollars for morals in the consumer context, it is evidence that they are willing to sacrifice dollars for morals in the investment context. 156 Survey data supports this finding. One survey asked shareholders what should be done with an employee that produced a profit, but did so by acting in a way considered unethical. 157 Respondents were told that the behavior was legal and that the employee had acted in the best interests of the corporation. 52% of shareholders said the employee should be warned against the conduct and fired if it happened again. 6% would terminate the employee immediately. Nearly all the rest, 37%, would be glad for the profits but would caution the employee about the methods used. Only 5% would reward the employee. Overall, 58% of shareholders would sacrifice profits for ethical behavior. And 95% of shareholders would prefer the employee not take actions seen as unethical, even if those actions are profitable and legal.
Survey data may be cheap talk, but there is strong evidence that individuals value moral and social interests in their actions as well. According to IRS data, individuals donate about 3.8% of their income to charities each year. 158 This is a direct trade of wealth for the advancement of social or moral norms. It is also remarkable because any single donation is unlikely to make a significant difference to the overall societal or moral issue addressed, so this giving is in spite of an economic incentive to free ride. 159 Experimental evidence also shows that individuals care for the interests of others, even when it involves a personal cost. 160 Behavioral economists often conduct experiments such as the "dictator game." In this game one player is given a pot of money and asked to unilaterally decide how much to keep and how much to anonymously give to another, anonymous player. The second player must accept the result. The game is played with actual money, and the players get to keep their winnings. Because the game is fully anonymous, there are no social repercussions to the dictator's decision. The wealth maximizing result is for the deciding party to keep the full amount. But on average deciding parties give between 20-30%. 161 Similar results have been found when the amount of money is increased and when participants are given more time to understand the payoff structure. 162 These results have been repeated across a broad range of cultures. 163 And recent work in neuroeconomics provides further evidence that our preferences for altruism and social interests are hard-wired in our physiology. 164 Professor Lynn Stout has, tongue in cheek, pointed to evidence from psychology to further make the point, arguing that a person that maximizes profits in their daily life at the expense of all other values would meet the American Psychiatric Association's diagnosis for a sociopath. 165 She points out that "only 1% to 3% of the U.S. population suffers from Antisocial Personality Disorder, and many of these individuals are safely locked away in prison." 166 Shareholders are willing to forego financial benefits to satisfy their conscience. This result is confirmed in actual investment decisions, behavioral economics, anthropology, neuroeconomics, psychology, marketing, and a long history of boycotts. It is also evident when we consider the actions of successful directors and officers when serving shareholders.
If shareholders at times prefer their nonfinancial interests over their financial interests, we should allow directors to consider the shareholders' nonfinancial interests.
B. Directors and Officers Consider Conscience When Weighing Financial Decisions
We have seen that the shareholder wealth maximization norm fails to account for shareholders willingness to forgo financial benefits to satisfy social and moral norms. This section will show that directors and officers already consider social and moral norms, in contrast to the requirements of the shareholder wealth maximization norm.
The question is not whether directors always try to maximize shareholder wealth. The vast literature on agency costs shows that directors frequently digress from shareholder wealth maximization to renovate their offices or pad their own compensation. 167 The 162 Id. 163 Id. at 801. For example, one experiment in a small Polynesian culture found the same result using cigarettes instead of money. I have a friend who is the chief fundraiser for a philanthropy. Been that for about five years. And he calls on corporate officers and he has a very simple technique when he calls. All he wants to do is take some other big shot with him who will sort of nod affirmatively while he meets with the CEO. He has found that what many big shots love (….continued) narrow question here is whether directors and officers take social and moral norms into account. We will begin by looking at what they say, then at what they do.
Directors and officers often speak about the importance of doing the right thing without focusing on the bottom line. Larry Page, founder of Google, has said, "If we were motivated by money, we would have sold the company a long time ago and ended up on a beach." 168 This sentiment is common among directors. One survey found that directors are almost six times more likely to serve out of a sense of service or desire to give back to the community than they are for compensation. 169 Mark Zuckerberg, chairman and CEO of Facebook, said, "Simply put: we don't build services to make money; we make money to build better services." 170 John Mackey, CEO of Whole Foods, echoes this sentiment, "Making high profits is the means to the end of fulfilling Whole Foods' core business mission. We want to improve the health and well-being of everyone on the planet through higher-quality foods and better
is what I call elephant bumping. I mean they like to go to the places where other elephants are, because it reaffirms the fact when they look around the room and they see all these other elephants that they must be an elephant too, or why would they be there? So when you see the Bohemian Club and the Business Round Table and things like that, it gives you some insight into what moves people. So my friend always takes an elephant with him when he goes to call on another elephant. And the soliciting elephant, as my friend goes through his little pitch, nods and the receiving elephant listens attentively, and as long as the visiting elephant is appropriately large, my friend gets his money. And it's rather interesting, in the last five years he's raised about 8 million dollars. He's raised it from 60 corporations. It almost never fails if he has the right elephant. And in the process of raising this 8 million dollars from 60 corporations from people who nod and say that's a marvelous idea, its prosocial, etc., not one CEO has reached in his pocket and pulled out 10 bucks of his own to give to this marvelous charity. They've given 8 million dollars collectively of other people's money. And so far he's yet to get his first 10-dollar bill. So far, the Salvation Army has done better at Christmas than essentially he's done with all these well-reasoned arguments that lead people to spend other people's money." A full accounting of these declarations (or puffery) could fill several articles, but it is undeniable that many directors and officers publicly declare they are not operating under the shareholder wealth maximization norm. 177 These are not rogue statements made without company approval. As discussed above, all but three of America's 50 largest companies have published reports or dedicated websites highlighting their social initiatives, which may include the environment, sustainability, treatment of employees or suppliers, community service or philanthropy. 178 The corporations themselves are publicly rejecting the shareholder wealth maximization norm.
But are these statements sincere? It's been pointed out that Enron won several awards for its social initiatives. 179 Perhaps these reports and quotes are mere greenwashing. The evidence suggests otherwise. Directors and officers are rejecting the shareholder wealth maximization norm through their actions as well.
At the outset we should recognize that it's logically impossible to separate what the company did for profit and what it did out of conscience. If the action is known, it can be presumed that the firm knew the action would become known. If the firm knew the action would become known, we can always argue this publicity was the real intent. 180 In other words, any example we might use as evidence must be known, and knowledge of the event diminishes its usefulness as evidence.
In addition, some social initiatives may be profit improving but not profit maximizing, which further complicates any distinction between promoting shareholders' financial and their nonfinancial interests. Empirical research has found mixed results, sometimes finding that social initiatives increase firm value and sometimes finding these initiatives decrease firm value. 181 For our purposes, the results are less important than the intention.
One survey found that corporate philanthropy increased 59% from 2007 to 2012, with companies "often cit[ing] a link between business performance and giving budgets." 182 It is a rare businessman that disagrees; an anonymous survey by McKinsey & Company found that only 6% of CFOs and 7% of investment professionals believe social initiatives reduce a company's value. 183 So some skepticism is required when considering any evidence provided one way or the other on directors' true motives.
We can alleviate the publicity problem somewhat by looking at anonymous survey results. If the survey is anonymous, the respondents cannot engage in puffery to add specific value to her company by inflating the importance of social initiatives.
One anonymous survey found that 59% of investment professionals and 82% of CFOs already integrate environmental, social or governance considerations into evaluations of their corporate projects. 184 Another asked corporate respondents what percent of their total philanthropic budget was used for various purposes. The responses were aggregated into an average, and the data showed that only three percent of philanthropy budgets were used primarily to benefit the corporation. 185 In contrast, 52% of these budgets were spent with "little or no business benefit" expected. 186 That is, each dollar corporations spend on philanthropy is 17 times more likely to go to causes that provide no expected benefit.
Another survey supported this conclusion, finding that 4.5% of executives expect no benefit at all from any of their social programs. 187 Combining these two surveys, 52% of spending is without any expectation of business benefit, and 4.5% of firms spend their entire philanthropic budget without an expectation of business benefit. This is significant given that surveys have found companies in the United States contribute about 1% of pretax profits to charity, amounting to billions of dollars given without an expectation of return. 188 These estimates are reflected in the attitudes of directors and officers. A survey of 1,122 senior business executives found that only 31.4% agreed with Milton Friedman 189 that the social responsibility of their business is to maximize profits. 190 In contrast, an aggregate of 61.4% provided some definition other than maximizing shareholder wealth, and 16.4% went so far as to say corporate responsibility requires "sacrificing some profits in order to do the right thing." 191 In addition, 22.6% said corporate responsibility "is meaningless if it includes things that companies would do anyway," which presumably includes profit maximizing. 192 These results are more pronounced outside the United States. A survey of directors of Australian companies found that only 6.6% believed that "acting in the best interests of the company required them to consider the long-term interests of shareholders only." 193 The American Law Institute in its summary of the law observed that "corporate decisions are not infrequently made on the basis of ethical considerations even when doing so would not enhance corporate profit or shareholder gain." 194 There is strong evidence that directors also rely on social and moral norms in their personal decision making. A Stanford study on MBA graduates across five business schools found that more than 90% would accept a smaller pay check to work for an organization with a better reputation for corporate social responsibility and ethics. 195 When prioritizing what they looked for in a job, MBAs were most interested in the intellectual challenge; the financial package was about 80% as important, and the firm's reputation for ethics and caring about employees was only three percent behind, at 77%. 196 Matriculation at business schools also supports this trend. Thomas Cooley, the dean of New York University's Stern Business School, said in 2008, "Demand for CSR [corporate social responsibility] activities has just soared in the past three years." 197 Today's MBAs are tomorrow's directors, so this is strong evidence that directors care about social initiatives. 198 Perhaps most surprising is that even those supporting shareholder wealth maximization occasionally recognize that it isn't descriptively accurate. Prof. Bainbridge, who has fought with unrivalled valiance and wit to defend shareholder wealth maximization, once conceded that, "no one other than the occasional law or economics professor seriously expects managers to leave their ethical and moral concerns at home." 199 Even Milton Friedman, the champion of wealth maximization, left room for directors to conform to "the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom." 200 It is clear that shareholder wealth maximization does not accurately predict or constrain director behavior. A theory is only as good as its ability to predict accurate outcomes. A rule is only as good as its ability to constrain behavior. The shareholder wealth maximization norm fails on both counts. It is empirically less valid than the broad shareholder value norm.
PART VI. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE REVISITED & CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
A. The Business Judgment Rule Revisited
If we agree that under some circumstances directors must consider shareholders' moral or social interests, then we find one additional, surprising result.
Suppose there is some scenario when directors are required to act upon moral or social interests, then in making any decision they must ask, "Is this that situation?" Which means that moral and social interests must be considered in each decision, even if only to ask whether we have reached an extreme situation. This means that if a director errs in balancing moral or social interests, this is an error of degree, not of kind.
The business judgment rule limits review of business decisions made in the ordinary course. For example, courts will not overturn a business decision that is an error in degree. If we thought we could make more money doing X than Y, but we erred, then the court will not review this error of degree.
Moving back to moral and social norms, because it is proper to consider moral or social interests, even if only to determine whether they are the extreme case, then an error when making these decisions is an error of degree that will not be reviewable by the courts. Doing so would require the court to exercise business judgment, which it is not well equipped to do. In other words, stakeholder theorists that would like corporations to have broad discretion to do social good do not need to prove as much as they attempt to. Instead, showing that moral and social interests are properly considered is sufficient to show that any errors here are proper business judgments. This prevents judicial review of these decisions. Stakeholders can reach the moral and social goals they seek by meeting the much lower bar set by the broad shareholder value norm.
B. Conclusion
The broad shareholder value norm resolves the conflict between the shareholder wealth maximization norm and theories that would consider the interests of employees, suppliers, local communities and the environment. It fits better into our theories about what a corporation is, it fits better into our case law, and it fits better over the empirical evidence of what shareholders actually want and how directors actually behave.
Still, more work needs to be done in this field. Surprisingly, there is a lack of survey data asking shareholders whether social and moral interests should be considered by directors. This survey data would be helpful, as would empirical studies of corporate behavior. Studies could focus on the observance of social or moral norms by sole proprietorships, in which the decision maker faces the full economic consequences of his actions. With better empirical evidence, we could establish the extent to which shareholders value social and moral norms and improve our theories of governance, sharpen our proposals for reform, and increase overall corporate efficiency.
While each board must determine how much weight is to be placed upon non-financial considerations in shareholder utility functions, this weight will typically be greater than zero-it is time to drop the restricting premises to the contrary. Likewise, we need not overcorrect, as stakeholder theories do, by expanding the set of stakeholders with valid claims on the firm in order to allow moral considerations in business decisions. When we recognize the broad values that shareholders hold, the role of conscience in corporate decision making is already inevitable. It's time we openly recognize this.
